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Abstract 
This article contributes to the field of evolutionary macroeconomics by highlighting the 
dynamic interlinkages between micro-meso-macro with a Veblenian meso foundation in 
an agent-based macroeconomic model. Consumption is dependent on endogenously 
changing social class and signaling, such as bandwagon, Veblen and snob effects. In 
particular we test the macroeconomic effects of this meso foundation in a generic agent-
based model of a closed artificial economy. The model is stock-flow consistent and builds 
upon local decision heuristics of heterogeneous agents characterized by bounded 
rationality and satisficing behavior. These agents include a multitude of households 
(workers and capitalists), firms, banks as well as a capital goods firm, a government and 
a central bank. Simulation experiments indicate co-evolutionary dynamics between 
signaling-by-consuming and firm specialization that eventually effect employment, 
consumer prices as well as other macroeconomic aggregates substantially. 
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1. Introduction 
Evolutionary economists have traditionally focused on the supply side, following the 
Schumpeterian avenue of economic analysis (Schumpeter 1934). Nelson and Winter 
(1982) coined this approach into a theoretical core with an analytical apparatus that has 
inspired, among others, De Bresson (1987) Dosi et al. (1988), Saviotti and Metcalfe 
(1991) and Witt (1992). Recently, this Schumpeterian theoretical core was also embedded 
into a macroeconomic framework (in particular an agent-based one) as shown by Dosi et 
al. (2010). Otherwise, evolutionary economics is also deeply rooted in the Veblenian 
avenue of economic analysis that dealt originally with the interrelations of consumer 
behavior, social class and institutional change (Veblen 1899). Even though the latter 
research strand found continuous improvements (Tool 1977, Bush 1987, Gruchy 1990, 
Hodgson 1998), neither did it develop a common analytical apparatus nor has there been 
any proper application in a macroeconomic framework. Our contribution aims to close 
this research gap by highlighting Veblenian consumption dynamics in an agent-based 
macroeconomic model. 
In this undertaking we basically follow the methodology of agent-based macroeconomics 
that received increasing attention in the Great Recession. As argued by Stiglitz (2015) the 
design of macroeconomic theory has to change substantially in order to arrive at a 
meaningful economic policy. The idea to integrate complexity and heterogeneity into 
macroeconomics has been articulated at several occasions during the last ten years, see 
especially Tesfatsion and Judd (2006), LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008), Farmer and Foley 
(2009), Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Kirman (2011), Stiglitz and Gallegati (2011) or Dosi 
(2012). Many have already followed this agenda and brought these claims to life in agent-
based macroeconomic models, compare Dosi et al. (2010), Ciarli et al. (2010), Cincotti 
et al. (2010), Delli Gatti et al. (2011), Seppecher (2012), Lengnick (2013), Riccetti et al. 
(2013), Chen et al. (2014), Rengs and Wäckerle (2014, 2017) and Caiani et al. (2016) for 
the recent publication of a new benchmark model in this realm. 
Evolutionary economists have started to develop their own theory of consumption within 
the last 15 years (compare Chai 2016), as illustrated by Witt (2001), Nelson and Consoli 
(2010), Chai and Moneta (2010), Valente (2012) and Kapeller et al. (2013). One of the 
first microeconomic models in this evolutionary direction was developed by Cowan et al. 
(1997) with a focus on bandwagon and snob effects in a heterogeneous population of 
consumers. Otherwise Malerba et al. (2007) and Safarzynska and van den Bergh (2010) 
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provided a basic simulation model on the co-evolution of industries, technological 
innovation, niche markets and ‘experimental users’. The latter article already introduces 
a differentiation between a “snob” and a “network effect” in the social mediation of 
preferences. However, this line of research has never found integration into 
macroeconomic models, with the exception of Ciarli et al. (2010) and Lorentz et al. 
(2016). Technically speaking, we do not know much about the endogenous welfare 
effects of signaling-by-consuming effects. Elsewhere, macroeconomists have conducted 
similar welfare experiments following neoclassical (Fisher and Hof 2005, Wendner 2010) 
as well as post-Keynesian approaches (van Treeck and Sturn 2012, Kapeller and Schütz 
2015). However, the latter approaches only have limited explanatory potential for a 
deeper analysis of structuration processes at work since they build on an aggregated 
representative agent model that has come under serious criticism for its explanatory 
limitations (Kirman 1992).To this extent, aggregated macroeconomic models face crucial 
limitations in addressing the interactive dynamics of imitating and innovating 
heterogeneous agents central to endogenous economic development (Veblen 1899, 
Schumpeter 1934). 
Instead, we follow an evolutionary macroeconomic approach – considered as integral to 
the larger research program of evolutionary political economy (Hanappi and Scholz-
Wäckerle 2017, Hanappi et al. 2017) – with endogenous consumer behavior dependent 
on social class. Economic agents are characterized as heterogeneous, diverse and 
boundedly rational. Their behavior depends on cognitive decision heuristics as well as on 
social norms and imitation. In this regard we follow roughly a micro-meso-macro 
framework (Dopfer et al. 2004, Elsner 2007, Dopfer et al. 2016), highlighting the social 
mediation of consumer preferences as a meso foundation in a complex evolving 
macroeconomic system (Scholz-Wäckerle 2017). The approach of evolutionary 
macroeconomics was originally formulated by Foster (1987) and was revived quite 
recently by Verspagen (2002), Foster (2011), Dosi (2012) and Hanappi (2014). While 
Dosi et al. (2010) as well as Ciarli et al. (2010) do not explicitly refer to evolutionary 
macroeconomics, their models implicitly follow the elementary evolutionary blocks as 
presented in Dosi (2012). The model presented in this article focuses on a Veblenian meso 
foundation. Thereby it contributes to evolutionary macroeconomics with a novel analysis 
of the dynamic implications of social distinction on the co-evolution of firm size, 
income/wealth distribution and macroeconomic aggregates such as unemployment and 
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GDP growth. Computational simulation experiments indicate that a wide adoption of 
conspicuous consumption behavior in the household population drives the 
macroeconomic system into turmoil, leading to unsustainable unemployment as well as 
severe losses in aggregate demand. We also show the simultaneous microeconomic 
effects on firm specialization due to different consumption behavior. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The characteristics of the Veblenian 
meso foundation and the corresponding class dynamics are expressed in Section 2. The 
general structure of the agent-based macroeconomic model, the goods market, the labor 
market, the credit market as well as the government and the central bank are explained in 
Section 3. Section 4 discusses the computational simulation experiments and its results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Household behavior: the Veblenian meso foundation of the agent-based 
macroeconomic model 
Veblen’s (1899) ‘Theory of the leisure class’ provides a model of conspicuous 
consumption behavior with basic political economic origins where consumer preferences 
are a matter of social rank. In contrast to the Marxian model of social class based upon 
the conflict over the societal means of production and the further development of the 
productive forces (Marx 1867) – thereby reshaping the relations of production – Veblen’s 
model focuses on leisure time and on property-based status. ‘To own property is to have 
status and honor’ (Trigg 2001: 100). The noble leisure class consumes conspicuously; 
thereby, it aims to show its wealth in public, whereas the ignoble industrious class is 
always one step behind in emulating this behavior. As shown by Trigg (2001), this 
economic motive of ‘social distinction’ is not just bound to the American society of the 
19th century. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has empirically shown that taste – 
conceived here as a consumer preference – is subject to social mediation and class 
fractions (Bourdieu 1984). To this extent social distinction provides an illustrative 
example of cultural hegemony, a way for the ruling class to dominate the aesthetics of the 
working class. Consumer preferences represent cultural reflections of class conflict in 
capitalist societies and contribute to the social reproduction of economic inequality 
(Bourdieu 1998). Trigg (2001) explained that Thorstein Veblen considered this social 
emulation of consumer preferences simply as a trickle-down process while Pierre 
Bourdieu pointed out that a trickle-around process was at work. 
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The model presented in Section 3 allows for the computational simulation of these 
features and therefore differs from other agent-based macroeconomic approaches in a 
number of ways, notably including distinct ownership (capitalist and working class) and 
consumption behavior following different norms. In addition, the model can generate the 
emergence of specialization patterns of firms reacting on the variety in consumption. In 
particular, a firm can for example initially produce goods that mainly serve basic needs, 
and over time shift to serving wants. The demand elasticities for each individual firm’s 
goods are thus changing over time, resulting from shifts in the perception of individual 
households. This avoids the more common approach of starting with a fixed classification 
of firms or sectors with particular goods that permanently retain their character. Our 
approach is parsimonious (simplified) without sacrificing richness in explanatory power. 
The meso foundation is described as dependent on agent networks and their dynamics. 
This causes consumption behavior to take the form of imitation (bandwagon effects) and 
signaling-by-consuming effects by different consumer classes. In the latter case, we 
consider Veblen effects (conspicuous consumption) and snob effects; both with a focus 
on luxury goods, where the first is about high price and the second about rare goods 
(Leibenstein 1950). Households do not optimize their consumption behavior (Valente 
2012) but are instead assumed to be rather loyal, or rigid, in their choice of vendors, while 
also being open to new opportunities that arise. Their decisions (namely, which firms’ 
products to buy) are linked to two different motivational aspirations: needs and wants 
(Witt 2001). The tendency to buy from a specific firm then depends on the respective 
aspiration, the current product’s relative price and the firm’s reputation. The latter two 
are based on well-documented consumer behaviors: bandwagon, Veblen and snob effects. 
The consumption decision differs with respect to social class with capitalist households 
and wealthy workers having a higher saving rate than workers.  
Households choose their seller in a boundedly rational way, by having a shortlist of 
preferred ‘vendors’ at any given time (similar to Lengnick 2013). They try to buy equal 
amounts from each firm on their list, as firms’ stock and household budgets permit. 
Households actually employ two lists, one for needs and one for wants. Initially, each of 
these lists consists of n randomly chosen firms. During the simulation, households change 
the composition of these lists based on their preferences, slowly improving them in each 
period (an artificial timespan which loosely represents a month). As preferences are 
assumed to be different for needs and wants, these two lists tend to contain different firms 
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after some time. In the case of needs, households will replace a firm that could not deliver 
– because of insufficient production or inventory – by another, randomly chosen one. In 
the wants case, households do not immediately replace a firm that could not deliver, as 
wants involve goods which are highly sought after. Instead, they wait up to three periods 
before randomly choosing a new one. 
If a seller (firm) is considered for potential replacement and is perceived to be better (by 
some small but noticeable degree) in terms of price and firm reputation (implying a utility 
premium for a household consuming that firm’s good) than the one selected for potential 
elimination from the list, the replacement is effectuated. The rules employed in this 
comparison partially depend on prices and firm reputation (market shares) as well as on 
personal wealth, following the dynamics of imitation and signaling-by-consuming 
(conspicuous consumption à la Veblen 1899). Technically speaking, we assume that there 
are ‘signaling-by-consuming’ effects at work, i.e. ‘…households engage in consumption 
not only for intrinsic value but also for its value as a signal’, following Heffetz (2011: 
1101) who provides evidence in support of this household behavior.  
In particular, Heffetz (2011) on the one hand extends the typical neoclassical consumption 
model by introducing the ‘visibility of a consumption good’ that is determining the 
agent’s elasticity to purchase it. On the other hand he shows the empirical validity of this 
model with U.S. household data on the relation between ‘expenditure visibility’ and 
‘elasticity estimates’, where ‘…the former can indeed predict the latter’ (Heffetz 2011: 
1102). Otherwise the author adds that ‘…the evidence is limited to one country, at one 
point in time, with consumer expenditures divided into only 29 categories’ (Heffetz 2011: 
1117). However, we are confident that these results will be replicated for other countries 
once the data on consumption expenditure become more robust and can be analyzed in 
depth.1 The resulting Engel curves – relations between total expenditures and expenditure 
for a particular good – for a changing consumption basket (Heffetz 2011: 1108 – 1109) 
provide first evidence why a certain commodity is purchased as a necessity (need) and 
the other as a luxury (want). To this extent the empirical analysis exercised by Heffetz 
(2011) delivers empirical correlations for Engel’s law: ‘…the poorer the family is, the 
larger the budget share it spends on nourishment’ (Chai and Moneta 2010: 225). In the 
following, we take this analysis as empirical foundation for the social mediation of 
                                                          
1 Compare recent work on the “Household Finance and Consumption Survey for the European Union” by 
Fessler et al. (2014) and Rehm et al (2016). 
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consumer preferences in our model, i.e. we explicitly model the observed ‘signaling-by-
consuming’ in an agent-based way and then further specify it following different effects 
such as bandwagon, Veblen and snob. 
In this context we follow on the one hand Veblen’s general suggestion of trickle-down 
effects in social structure (Trigg 2001), due to working-class consumers imitating 
capitalist-class consumers. And on the other hand we are inspired by Leibenstein (1950), 
who specified consumption dynamics as resembling a bandwagon effect (imitation of 
other consumers) and contrasted it to the signaling-by-consuming effect described by 
Thorstein Veblen (luxury consumption) and snob effect (consumption striving for rare 
goods – ‘exclusiveness’). We model Veblenian consumer dynamics in a similar manner 
as Kapeller and Schütz (2015) but with substantially more details on differences in 
quantity and price effects as well as about the underlying social dynamics. Additionally 
we employ a snob effect that roughly represents Bourdieu’s (1984) model of trickle-
around (Trigg 2001). Snob consumption is modeled as pure distinction, as the opposite 
to the bandwagon effect. This distinction is crucial for our setting, because it avoids 
potential lock-ins in market dynamics. Due to this effect, even already established firms 
may crash after many years and allow for a complete restructuring of the economy.  
 ‘Any real market for semi durable or durable goods will most likely contain consumers 
that are subject to one or a combination of the effects discussed heretofore.’ Leibenstein 
(1950: 205) concludes that there are four possible combinations dependent on price 
(normal price and Veblen effect) and firm reputation (bandwagon and snob effect). We 
extend his framework by including needs and wants aspirations as well as social class. 
This leads us to combinations of aspiration (wants and needs) and social class (workers, 
wealthy workers, capitalists), compare Figure 1. 
Wright (2015) distinguishes between three different modes of class analysis: Marxian, 
Weberian and stratification class analysis. The Marxian class analysis associates classes 
with its ‘systemic level of power’ and the ‘locations within the relations of domination 
and exploitation in production’ (Wright 2015: 13), it links it to the ‘conflict over 
production’. The Weberian class analysis focuses on the institutional level of power and 
locates it in the ‘conflict over distribution’. Eventually the stratification mode of class 
analysis highlights the ‘situational level of power’ and indicates class as ‘…how to best 
realize interests under fixed rules’. Wright (2015: x). The latter approach obviously works 
at the individual level and it would literally allow an infinite number of social classes. 
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The Veblenian and Bourdieusian system of social class fits perfectly into this situational 
approach. The Weberian system addresses what Wright (2015: 6) calls ‘opportunity 
hoarding’ and is related to the meritocratic society that creates social closure via skills, 
education or other criteria of job exclusion. This model of social class is represented in 
the agent-based macroeconomic model of Ciarli et al. (2010) and Lorentz et al. (2016: 
225), where ‘firms are composed of distinct hierarchies of labor’. The consumer 
preferences differ with regard to these job levels, but are not socially mediated. The model 
we present here explicitly implements ownership and is thereby able to address conflicts 
over production as well. In particular we implement a mixture of Marxian classes and 
Veblenian social stratification. McIntyre (1992: 43) emphasizes that ‘Marx understood 
the social construction of needs in a manner that partly anticipates Veblen. … Marx 
argues that conspicuous consumption can convince financiers of the likelihood of loans 
being repaid, giving capitalists access to more credit, or credit on better terms’. Eventually 
our model features basic material as well as cultural properties of consumption in 
capitalist production systems thereby (Fine 2002). Capitalists gain individual dividends 
from firm profits and workers gain income from wages. In our model, we do not 
distinguish workers by skill or education and job level but by income and wealth, hence 
we feature a middle class representing wealthy workers. 
Changes within social class are endogenously possible (capitalists may go bankrupt with 
their firm, wealthy workers may found a firm, etc.), which will not be recognized by the 
society immediately; meaning in particular that if there is a change in social class it 
happens with a lag (set at three months). Workers, wealthy workers and capitalists have 
different preferences and behaviors as highlighted in Figure 1. Workers’ needs 
consumption has a high normal price effect (indicating a strong preference for the cheap 
over the expensive) and a low bandwagon effect. Workers imitate the behavior of all 
needs consumers. Worker wants aspirations have a low normal price effect (indicating a 
weak preference for the cheap over the expensive) and a high bandwagon effect (they 
imitate the capitalist wants aspirations). Whereas wealthy workers follow the same 
bandwagon, they further consume showing a weak Veblen effect (i.e. they weakly prefer 
the expensive over the cheap).  
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Figure 1: Signaling-by-consuming effects dependent on social class 
Finally, capitalist (firm and bank owners’) needs are triggered partially by a snob effect 
(searching for rare goods – inverted imitation) and partially by a normal price effect. 
Capitalist wants work with the same partial snob effect but additionally with a Veblen 
effect (they prefer the expensive over the cheap). Consumption behavior is thus not static 
but a co-evolving process between behaviors of consumers and social structure. 
As indicated before, our model households employ shortlists of preferred firms for each 
consumption case. These lists are updated every period by considering a random firm, 
which is not yet part of the shortlist and comparing the utility of purchasing from this 
specific firm with that of purchasing from a random firm on the shortlist. This evaluation 
follows the behavioral modes (as described above and sketched in Figure 1) and thus 
differs for the households’ social class and consumption aspiration. As an exemplary case 
for how the utility is derived for the worker needs in period 𝑡𝑡, see the following equations: 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (1) 
𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (2) 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (3) 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜉𝜉) (4) 
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where 𝑖𝑖 denotes a firm, 𝑗𝑗 denotes the household and 𝑡𝑡 the time period. Now 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents 
the firm’s normalized relative price in comparison to the prices of all other firms and 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 
represents the household’s normalized relative wealth in relation to all other households. 
Furthermore 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the firm’s normalized reputation, while 𝑣𝑣 is calculated from 
firms’ past sales; in this exemplary case of worker needs, it directly corresponds to firms’ 
market shares to reflect the bandwagon effect. Finally the utility 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is derived by 
weighting the price component 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 with the relative wealth 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 and the parameter 𝜉𝜉, then 
by adding the firm’s reputation and weighting it with (1 − 𝜉𝜉). By choosing 𝜉𝜉 in a 
meaningful way (𝜉𝜉 = 0.75 in our simulations) we arrive at a combined utility, which 
makes households in the worker needs case strongly prefer cheaper firms (which is less 
important for wealthier households) and at the same time less strongly prefer relatively 
successful firms. The remaining four cases of worker wants, wealthy worker wants, 
capitalist needs and wants are defined similarly, compare Appendix 3. 
3. The general structure of the agent-based macroeconomic model 
In our model, agents are heterogeneous and endogenously adapting their behavior in 
terms of bounded rationality (Simon 1996: 38; 166), following satisficing rules (Simon 
1996: 27 – 30). The model does not contain any aggregate exogenous (re)distribution 
function from top down, i.e. the markets are self-organizing systems and thus 
interdependently developing from the bottom up. The basic object categories and their 
relations are shown in Figure 2.  
Firms and households interact on a goods and labor market. Firms produce and sell a 
homogeneous good – representing a fictitious basket of diverse goods – to households. 
The good is produced with the same production inputs (physical capital and labor), but 
may differ with regard to branding and price from firm to firm. All households have to 
satisfy their basic needs in every period and thus always try to buy the minimum amount 
for subsistence consumption (while trying to keep a reserve worth one period of 
subsistence consumption). However, households can demonstrate their wealth in 
conspicuous terms and buy additional quantities above subsistence level (wants). 
Capitalist households do so in self-organization, determining which firm sells the same 
good in a conspicuous way, because worker households seek to imitate and follow this 
call for reputation by a given weighting, as explained in the previous section.  
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Figure 2: General structure of the agent-based macroeconomic model 
Firms and banks interact on a simplified credit market, and banks interact with the central 
bank. The state (government) collects taxes and uses them to finance social transfers to 
pensioners and unemployed households. Government surpluses are equally redistributed 
in the economy. As a very crude proxy to government bonds we assume that banks and 
households finance the sovereign debt that exceeds available funds. 
3.1. Firms: Consumer and capital goods production 
We distinguish between two types of firms: producing capital goods and consumer goods. 
In the simulation experiments presented in Section 4, a single capital goods producing 
firm provides all consumer goods firms with machines and equipment, i.e. the physical 
capital input for production. We maintain stock-flow consistency since capital goods 
profits made on behalf of consumer goods producers’ investments are redistributed 
equally among capitalists in the economy. We simply assume that investment goods are 
owned and thereby controlled collectively by the capitalist class.  
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Each consumer goods firm has only one private owner, who is the sole receiver of the 
firm’s profits. We choose this contrary to other published mechanisms, such as dispersing 
profits to the whole population in relation to their wealth, as a proxy for shares, e.g. Dosi 
et al. (2010), Cincotti et al. (2010) or Lengnick (2013). The latter more aggregate and 
distributive approach also leads to the rich getting richer but ignores the possibility of 
individual failure – i.e. rich households can never make a bad investment and thus go 
bankrupt more seldom than they should. We regard this mechanism as highly problematic 
given the huge impact that extreme developments of single agents can have in complex 
and highly interconnected adaptive systems2. 
We assume that consumer goods firms are on a market with boundedly rational buyers, 
who show satisficing rather than optimizing behavior, which on the household side has 
different implications for needs and wants as previously elaborated in detail in Section 2. 
Firms initially determine the price on the basis of their costs, adding some individual 
random markup – as empirically shown by Fabiani et al. (2006) for the Euro area – while 
adapting price and output during the regular simulation solely based on changes in 
consumer demand. There is no such mechanism in mainstream macroeconomic theory; 
compared to traditional microeconomics this assumption can get associated with basic 
market power – in our case we would interpret the boundedly rational behavior in 
conjunction with a preference to buy locally, leading to a market form with monopolistic 
competition. Usually publications of macroeconomic ABMs avoid mentioning specific 
market forms, instead stating that the interaction on markets should be empirically micro-
founded (Dosi et al. 2013), arguing that adding markup to costs is absolute common 
practice in most real firms, see e.g. Fabiani et al. (2006). Lengnick (2013) stresses the 
argument even further that there is no market form in the traditional microeconomic 
sense, only the result of endogenous interactions of agents, which one could call market.  
Consumer goods firms use a simple short-run adaption strategy to determine required 
production and pricing, which is based on the assumption that overall demand might shift 
due to changes in consumer behavior, but that huge deviations from previous prices are 
too risky. Preliminary simulation experiments have shown that the influence of consumer 
behavior leads to much more stable economies, when assuming that firms’ production 
schedules are directly determined by expectations about sales, rather than assuming only 
                                                          
2 Compare Lengnick (2013) who devoted a whole section to the consequences of a small individual shock. 
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slight adaptions of previous production schedules, based on previous sales. Thus, firms 
expect to sell as much as in the last period (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠 ) but factor in excess demand (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ).  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠 + 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  (10) 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of Godley and Lavoie (2012), each firm 𝑖𝑖’s target is to keep 
their inventory after sales (unsold goods) (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 ) at an optimal reserve level (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡), which 
is proportional to the previous production (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ), as they are prepared that actual sales 
might deviate from their expectations: 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 – 1𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  =  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  𝛼𝛼11 + 𝛼𝛼1  (11) 
Firms try to meet this level by on the one hand directly adjusting production and on the 
other hand consider slightly adapting prices. Produced goods can be sold in the same 
period as they are produced (firms produce and sell goods directly to consumers). 
Overproduction (unsold stock) is stored until the next period but depreciates. The 
intended production amount (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝′) then factors in the expected sales in t (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ), the intended 
reserve stock as well as the depreciation of unsold goods (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠): 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝′ = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 (1 + 𝛼𝛼1) − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠(1 − 𝛿𝛿1) (12) 
Thus, in the unique case that there are more goods in the reserve inventory than expected 
sales, the firm would even choose not to produce anything in this period. 
Independently of the planned production schedule, firms base their price on the previous 
period’s price (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) and consider changing the price by a fraction of a simulation-
specific maximum amount (𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏), which is based on the average initial price over all firms 
in 𝑡𝑡 = 0 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡0𝑚𝑚).  
𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡0𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼2 (13) 
The fraction depends on the deviation from the intended reserve stock (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) and the 
parameter 𝛼𝛼2, which is chosen rather small, assuming that firms will not increase or 
decrease the price strongly in one period. If sales were much lower than expected 
(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 > 2𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡), then the price is decreased strongly: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − (1 + 𝛼𝛼3)𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 (14a) 
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If sales were noticeably lower than expected (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 – 1𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 (1 + 𝛼𝛼43) < 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 ≤ 2𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡), then 
the price is decreased in relation to the deviation from the planned reserves: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 – 1𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 – 1𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 (14b) 
If sales were roughly as expected, (
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 – 1𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡
1+𝛼𝛼4
≤ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 – 1𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 (1 + 𝛼𝛼3)), then the old price is 
retained: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 (14c) 
If sales were noticeably higher than expected (0 < 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 < 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 – 1𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡1+𝛼𝛼34), then the price is 
increased in relation to the deviation from the planned reserves: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 (14d) 
Finally, if sales were much higher than expected and there were no reserves left (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 =0), then the price is increased strongly: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼3)𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 (14e) 
The per-unit production costs (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) serve as the lower limit of the new price. 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = max�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ � (15) 
Finally, the new price (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ ) only becomes effective with a given probability (𝑋𝑋1 > 𝜃𝜃1 
with 𝑋𝑋1~𝑈𝑈(0,1)) to cope for the fact that firms do not change prices that often. Otherwise 
the old price (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) will be retained. 
Consumer goods firms need physical capital (machines and equipment (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 )) and labor 
(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 ) as input factors for the production of goods. As previously indicated, firms buy 
capital goods (i.e. physical capital in our model) from the capital goods firm. We employ 
a simple linear, transformative production function at the firm level which uses a simple 
capital intensity coefficient (𝛼𝛼6). Furthermore, the production function features an 
associated heterogeneous production-technology coefficient per firm (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) which was 
assumed to be constant (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼5) for the performed simulation experiments presented 
in Section 4. 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝛼6,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 � (16) 
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After determining the intended production output as indicated, each firm 𝑖𝑖 controls for 
the required production inputs in order to produce (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝′), starting with labor input (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 ): 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′ = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (17) 
If firm 𝑖𝑖 has not employed enough workers for the planned production schedule in the last 
period (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ > 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1), then it scans the labor market for the current number of 
unemployed (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡∗). 𝑡𝑡∗ indicates the point of time within the period 𝑡𝑡 where a decision is 
made in random order. If the number of potential new employees is sufficient to realize 
its production plan, i.e. if 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡∗ ≥ (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′ − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑙𝑙 ), then the production schedule remains 
unchanged (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′′ = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ ). If it is not sufficient, then firm 𝑖𝑖 reduces the planned production 
output (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′ ) to the highest possible quantity (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′′ ), given the actual number of 
unemployed. Eventually it controls for the required physical capital input (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐′ ): 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙′ = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (18) 
If firm 𝑖𝑖 is confronted with less available physical capital than required (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑐𝑐 < 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐′ ), 
then it seeks to reinvest. Firms finance investments into physical capital by means of 
loans, as assumed in the initial setup of the simulation. They obtain further loans as long 
as their expected short-term profitability remains high enough and their expected debt 
low enough. Thus, commercial banks will not grant additional credit to firms if the debt 
exceeds the bankable collateral, in order to limit their risk. To this effect, the aggregate 
loan volume so far (with 𝑜𝑜 indicating the period in which the loan was granted and 𝑏𝑏 
indicating the respective bank) plus the newly requested loan amount (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐′𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑏𝑏) may not 
exceed the current value of their physical capital after investing. As the value of physical 
capital regularly depreciates (each year by a fixed percentage), the current value has to be 
calculated with 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 representing the mean value of firm 𝑖𝑖’s machines and 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 being the 
price of one machine in 𝑡𝑡. Furthermore, as there is much uncertainty associated with the 
future performance of the firm and the consumer goods market in general, banks will only 
lend up to a fraction of this sum, which is obtained by factoring in a bank-specific risk 
aversion disposition (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏). The latter is identical (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 = 𝜙𝜙1 for all banks 𝑏𝑏) for the 
simulation experiments explained in Section 4. Ergo, the first firm loan condition has to 
hold: 
�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜,𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐′𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑏𝑏 ≤ �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑐𝑐 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐′ − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑐𝑐 �𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐�𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 (19) 
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Furthermore, banks will not grant more credit to firms whose estimated expected profit 
rate is lower than the bank’s interest rate on firm loans (𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ), so the second firm loan 
condition has to hold additionally: 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ≥ 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  (20) 
The expected profit rate is based on last period’s revenues and total costs per period 
(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1). Thus banks are more risk-averse than firms and assume that sales will remain 
constant (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠 ), while factoring in the additional costs for new loans plus additional staff 
(Δ𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡). 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + Δ𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (21) 
Firms now apply for the biggest loan 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐′𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑏𝑏 ≤ �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐′ − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑐𝑐 �𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐, that is not violating the 
two firm loan conditions set by the bank. Consequently, this notion might even result in 
not applying for additional credit. Firms use this credit to buy additional physical capital 
from the capital goods firm and thus arrive at a new level (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ). Finally, firm 𝑖𝑖 determines 
the highest possible production output (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝′ ), and derives the corresponding required 
labor input (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 ). As the job market is highly abstracted in this model, if firms need to hire 
additional workers (if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 > 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑙𝑙 ), the required number of households is randomly drawn 
from the number of unemployed households and employed at the respective firm. If the 
firm has not received any additional loan to finance the necessary physical capital or if it 
faces decreasing demand, labor input is reduced by firing random workers from its staff. 
Otherwise, workers are employed with a legal protection period (see Seppecher 2012 for 
an ABM), as wages have to be paid two more months, thus decreasing the effective 
production capacity.  
If the situation worsens, and a firm’s expected profit rate (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ) is no longer positive while 
at the same time its net liabilities exceed a multiple of its bankable collateral, it goes 
bankrupt. As a consequence, the firm is foreclosed on, it leaves the market, its customer 
relations are dissolved and the remaining assets plus remaining loans are transferred to 
the bank where the firm had open credit liabilities. In addition, if the firm defaults the 
capitalist household transforms into a worker agent but keeps its previous private account. 
Workers in the same firm get the same wage, which may differ between companies, but 
there is a countrywide minimum wage that has to be obeyed. At the end of each year, 
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firms with positive profits increase wages based on the increase of consumer prices, 
whereas firms without or with negative profits keep wages constant, i.e. wages are 
downward rigid. 
At the end of a fiscal year, all firms calculate their profits, pay corporate taxes to the 
government/state and distribute a large part of profits (after taxes) to the firm’s owner, 
while the rest remains with the firm to cover future operational costs (if positive profits 
existed). 
3.2. Households 
Additionally to the Veblenian meso foundation, explained in Section 2, households 
employ the following characteristics. In line with Lengnick (2013) wealthier households 
are inclined to consume less of their disposable income. Presupposing class-specific 
behavior, we assume (as a simplification) that workers tend to consume a large share of 
their income (𝛽𝛽1), wealthy workers tend to consume a slightly smaller share (𝛽𝛽2), while 
finally capitalists tend to consume an even smaller share again than the wealthy workers 
(𝛽𝛽3). The disposable income (𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 ) for workers is their monthly wage, whereas for 
capitalists we assume a fictitious income equal to one-twelfth of last year’s dividends. 
Furthermore we assume that households with positive savings of all classes set aside a 
very small share of their savings for additional consumption (𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 𝛾𝛾1). Thus, depending 
on their class-specific consumption share (𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐, that is 𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2,𝛽𝛽3, respectively), households 
set their intended savings (𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ) and consumption (𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ) to: 
𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐) (22) 
𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚  – 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠  𝛾𝛾1 (23) 
As prices and stock vary between vendors, these are the ex-ante decisions of the 
household before consumption. The actual consumption therefore depends on the 
respective prices and available stock of goods of each firm on household 𝑗𝑗’s preference 
list in 𝑡𝑡:  
𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = �𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚
𝑘𝑘=1
 (24) 
Each household 𝑗𝑗 tries to buy equal quantities (𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠) from each firm 𝑘𝑘 on its preference 
list as long as that firm is not yet out of stock (𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝛾𝛾1). In the special case that household 
𝑗𝑗’s total wealth in 𝑡𝑡 (𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡) is negative, i.e. when the household has no savings left (𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
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0) and the bank account is empty or overdrawn (𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 ≤ 0), which is the only form of 
household debt in the model, it is regarded as bankrupt. Households of all classes may in 
this case only satisfy their needs by minimal subsistence consumption (a fixed amount of 
goods purchased on overdraft) from their preferred vendors on the respective shortlist (as 
explained in Section 2), i.e. 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠. In this context we refer only to the bankruptcy 
of household agents. Since the account of the capitalist household is listed separately from 
the firm’s account we need to distinguish between firm and household bankruptcy. 
Households that are not bankrupt try to satisfy their wants by buying from their preferred 
vendors on the respective shortlist until the remainder of their consumption budget (which 
was left after satisfying their needs) is spent or until their preferred vendors are outsold. 
To avoid unrealistic goods allocation situations, we split each period’s consumption 
‘phase’ in multiple simulation phases (as can be seen in Appendix 1), where in a first 
phase all households satisfy their needs (𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠). The remainder of household 𝑗𝑗’s budget 
set aside for consumption left after this first phase is then available to satisfy their wants: 
𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑒𝑒  =  𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 − 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 (25) 
Thus, all households that still have some consumption budget left after satisfaction of 
their needs (𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑒𝑒 > 0), enter a second phase, in which capitalist households may 
satisfy their wants first and worker households may satisfy their wants afterwards. Inside 
these phases and thus within classes, order is random. Similarly, households now try to 
buy the same quantity from all vendors on their respective preference lists, but have to 
obey a budget restriction (𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑒𝑒). They thus again pay different prices for goods of 
each vendor.3 As a result, actual want (𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠) and finally total consumption (𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡) may 
be smaller than the originally intended consumption (i.e. 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ), where:  
𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 (26) 
After the consumption phase, all households evaluate their preferred vendor lists as 
elaborated in Section 2, seeking to find firms that better match their preferences, which 
is a co-evolving process.  
                                                          
3 In the simulation this is achieved by consecutively buying small amounts from each vendor until the 
budget left for the satisfaction of needs (𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡,𝑒𝑒) is used up or the vendors on the list are outsold. 
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That part of household 𝑗𝑗’s income which was not set aside for consumption in 𝑡𝑡, i.e. 
intended savings (𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ), or could not be spent on consumption for whatever reason is 
transferred from the bank account (𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 ) to the household’s savings account (𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ), with: 
𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 − 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (27) 
With a low probability, which increases for a quarter of a year after a firm has gone 
bankrupt, a wealthy worker household may found a new firm of a given small initial size. 
The firm will only be founded if there still are enough unemployed workers available on 
the labor market. The wealthy worker who turned into a capitalist will then invest and 
thus transfer money to the newly founded firm, to the amount which equals the cost of 
the physical capital as well as operating cost for a given amount of periods. In case the 
household does not have enough savings to cover these founding costs, as a simplification 
the bank will implicitly lend the money to the household (private debt) by allowing it to 
overdraw its bank account. The new firm will initially pay a wage equivalent to the 
average of all wages paid by firms in that period. Banks are assumed to act carefully 
rather than with greed regarding the granting of additional credit. As a consequence, 
newly founded firms can only grow slowly at best, as they would then have more credit 
than bankable collateral (i.e. physical capital).  
3.3. Government and the state 
The government assumes various roles in the model. It makes transfers to unemployed 
and retired households, and collects taxes on labor, income and capital gains, corporate 
profits made by banks and firms and by the capital goods firm, and value-added of sales. 
The government budget in the model is never in perfect balance because of uncertainty 
about both tax revenues and government expenditures – just as in reality. As 
unemployment benefits and pensions are downward rigid, the government has no means 
to cut costs and has to begin deficit spending if necessary. If indebted, it pays interest to 
banks and households (in relation to their wealth) as a proxy for government bonds. As a 
simplification, the government redistributes surpluses equally in the economy after every 
fiscal year. 
3.4. The monetary sector: central bank and commercial banks 
The central bank is lender of last resort for banks, and furthermore it provides commercial 
bank services for states as a minor secondary/tertiary function. The central bank keeps 
current accounts for the government (including overdraft functionality) and banks, as well 
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as deposit facilities for banks, involving the paying or charging of interest. Banks keep 
current accounts for firms, the capital goods firm (which has equally sized accounts with 
every bank as not to distort the banking system) and households (allowing for deficits) as 
well as separate savings accounts for households. In addition, they grant firm loans as 
described in section 3.1, whereas households cannot apply for loans in a regular way, as 
described in section 3.2. They pay and charge interest for these different financial services 
applying distinct rates, limited by central bank interest rates. Banks have to refinance 
themselves by monitoring assets (loans) and liabilities (savings). If banks lack liquidity 
they request loans at the central bank. Regular money is stored in bank accounts (which 
can – under specific conditions – also be overdrawn, i.e. be negative) or in savings 
accounts (households). At the end of a fiscal period, banks calculate their profits, pay 
corporate taxes to the government/state and transfer a large part of profits (after taxes) to 
the bank’s owner. 
4. Computational simulation experiments and results 
In the following we choose a number of very different but highly artificial combinations 
of household consumption behavior to demonstrate the endogenous self-organized 
structuration of firm populations and corresponding macroeconomic outcomes. In order 
to show the implications of the co-evolutionary dynamics in this agent-based 
macroeconomic model4 we have experimented with various configurations of 
consumption behavior, in particular effecting the households’ replacement rules for needs 
as well as wants.  
4.1. Simulation experiments and scenarios 
Scenario CB1  
Scenario CB1 is characterized – in Veblen’s terminology – by the instrumental 
proclivities of the industrial society.5 In this scenario we simply assume that all agents 
consume according to the consumption behavior of ‘worker needs’, i.e. the needs and 
                                                          
4 See Appendix 2 for technical details of the computational simulation. 
5 Compare Tool (1977) for an introduction into Veblen’s conception of two different institutional systems 
in the industrial society, “…they are institutions of acquisition or of production…they are pecuniary or 
industrial institutions…” (Tool 1977: 827) Instrumental proclivities are associated with the instinct of 
workmanship that characterizes e.g. the engineer and the common production of goods. Otherwise we find 
pecuniary proclivities associated with the business enterprise and the leisure class. The latter tend to crowd 
out the former in capitalist societies, a central thesis in Veblen’s work. 
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wants replacement rules for the individual agent’s list of local firms follows equations 
(1), (2), (3) and (4). Thus, all households consume only on behalf of a strong normal price 
effect and a weak bandwagon quantity effect. 
Scenario CB2  
Scenario CB2 follows the same assumptions as CB1 but introduces a stronger social 
mediation for wants. In this scenario all households of all classes again replace their 
individual firms’ preferences lists for needs as well as wants by equations (1), (2), (3) and 
(4). Contrary to scenario CB1, all households now discern needs and wants consumption 
by assuming a stronger bandwagon effect for the latter (𝜉𝜉 = 0.25). Imitation of wants 
consumption thus affects the whole population of households. 
Scenario CB3  
Scenario CB3 introduces a distinct consumption behavior of capitalists to CB1, i.e. 
capitalists replace their firms’ preferences lists concerning wants consumption with 
emphasis to snob-guided signaling-by-consuming. Capitalists replace their individual 
firm lists in both the needs and the wants case with regard to the snob effect but follow a 
normal price effect. In this scenario, social distinction (Bourdieu 1984) dominates the 
capitalist consumers concerning their wants, i.e. they aim to buy at rare firms and thus act 
against the logic of bandwagon. Specifically, trickle-around effects (Trigg 2001) are at 
work here since the snob effect may drive capitalist households to firms that have 
previously been sought by workers. 
Scenario CB4  
Scenario CB4 represents a similar experiment as CB3 but with emphasis on signaling-
by-consuming just via the Veblen effect, while not acting on behalf of the snob effect. In 
particular, capitalists aim to buy more expensive goods to satisfy their wants. This 
scenario represents the Veblenian meso foundation of the social mediation of preferences 
(Veblen 1899) at best, where snob effects are not at work and social mediation works just 
via trickle-down imitation (Trigg 2001). This scenario comes closest to the one used by 
Kapeller and Schütz (2015) in their aggregated model.  
Scenario CB5  
Scenario CB5 substantiates Veblen’s dystopian vision of a society that has already 
crowded out the instrumental proclivities and conspicuous consumption dominates in 
population. All households of all classes replace their firms’ preferences lists for needs 
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and wants as assumed for the capitalist needs and wants case, compare Figure 1. In this 
scenario, neither bandwagon nor normal price effects are active anymore. Households 
aim to follow solely snob (quantity) and Veblen (price) effects. 
Scenario CB6  
Eventually, scenario CB6 is to be considered as the most likely scenario for Western 
industrialized societies as illustrated in Figure 1. We assume all four modeled consumer 
behaviors are performed in this scenario, according to Leibenstein (1950). Workers 
imitate capitalists with regard to their wants, wealthy workers follow a weak Veblen 
effect. Capitalists aim to act snobby in context of needs as well as wants but give emphasis 
to conspicuous consumption in the wants case only. This scenario combines all the 
mechanisms introduced in Section 2.6 
4.2. Discussion of results 
The data set generated via the previously described simulation experiments is 
characterized by a high degree of complexity that we aim to analyze in our following 
discussion of results. The simulation features high-granular ‘monthly’ data over 360 
periods for a number of aggregated measures. Those figures that show micro data contain 
the results of all 30 repetitions for each scenario. A number of figures show annual 
numbers, which are averages over annual aggregates of each scenario’s repetitions. 
In our model, we have highlighted the role of consumption and class in an evolving 
macroeconomic complex system. Social class was assumed – in line with Wright (2015)  
– as a result of conflict over production on the one hand and the expression of the 
situational level of power – ‘how to best realize interests under fixed rules’ – on the other 
hand. Figures 3a and 3b show the evolution of the Lorenz curve that is first of all 
characterized by a kink separating working from capitalist class as a function of 
ownership over the means of production. As we assumed a simple governmental social 
transfer mechanism in this experiment, which redistributes potential budget surpluses 
equally, it is to be expected that the distribution of wealth will become more equal over 
time under optimal economic conditions. Figure 3a shows that scenario CB5 leads to a 
less equal distribution of wealth over time, as unemployment eventually reaches a level 
where the government budget goes into deficit. Figure 3b on the other hand shows that 
                                                          
6 Compare Appendix 3 for the analytical specifications of individual updating rules for signaling-by-
consuming effects. 
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income, which is the sum of wages and capital gains per household, does not change that 
strongly after the initial phase and that scenario CB5 leads to income being more equally 
distributed than in the other scenarios (compare Figure 4). The main reason for this starkly 
different development of CB5 is that there are not any regular price effects. Initially, the 
excess demand for the goods of individual firms lead to high prices and to more frequent 
increases in prices than in wages – as the former can change monthly and the latter is 
settled annually. Correspondingly, this effect decreases wants consumption, as an 
increasing share of the wages has to be paid for needs consumption. In consequence, we 
are dealing with excess labor capacities in the short run. Although these would even out 
in the long run, some households become unemployed and further reduce their demand 
before they would receive a wage increase (due to the cumulated increase in prices) 
countering the effect. The different speeds of adaptation – that our model centrally 
features – lead to lags and thus imperfections across the markets (goods, labor and credit). 
In addition, some firms go bankrupt and as all households show the same behavioral 
inclinations in CB5, their demand focuses on fewer firms, which furthermore are unable 
to grow quickly enough – no Cobb-Douglas adaptation of input factors – to deal with the 
excess demand. Eventually, these effects lead scenario CB5 into stagflation until the 
economy stabilizes at higher nominal price and wage levels (compare Figures 7, 8, 9). 
 
Figure 3a: Evolution of the Lorenz curve  –  wealth 
 
Figure 3b: Evolution of the Lorenz curve  –  income 
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Figure 4: Distribution of wages 
Social class conditions particular patterns of consumption behavior which otherwise 
influences firm specialization. Figure 5 illustrates micro data from the conducted 
experiments – including all repetitions – for relative price in relation to each firm’s share 
of needs consumption. It especially highlights the different effects stemming from the 
meso foundation with regard to snob (CB3) as well as Veblen (CB4) consumption in the 
capitalist class on firm evolution. The resulting dynamics indicate that in general a high 
relative price corresponds to a low needs share in consumption. That said, we otherwise 
observe a high wants share if relative prices are high, with exception of scenario CB5, 
where households purchase needs in a conspicuous fashion as well. The specifications of 
CB5 undermine firm specialization and hence the emergence of a deeper structure in the 
industry. This conclusion is also true for CB1, where households follow just the normal 
price effect and a rather weak bandwagon effect. On the contrary, CB6 leads to the 
emergence of such a deeper structure in the industry and resembles a scenario of firm 
specialization as it is common to Western industrialized societies. Firm populations 
endogenously evolve with broad price spreads where a subpopulation of firms specializes 
on the production of expensive wants. This simulation result demonstrates the 
evolutionary core of this agent-based macroeconomic model. 
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Figure 5: Firm specialization: needs share vs. relative price 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of just capitalist consumers over firms for all scenarios 
over time by showing the results of all repetitions (reruns). All scenarios start rather 
homogeneously in 𝑡𝑡 = 1, while evolving quite distinct behavioral capitalist consumption 
patterns for the different scenarios, which furthermore are rather well defined with regard 
to the variation of the random element (repetitions). Here we can particularly differentiate 
the dynamics of CB3 and CB4. The snob effect drives capitalists to smaller firms in CB3 
and leads to a distinguished set of firms with a newly emerging peak in the relative 
frequency. Signaling-by-consuming leads hereby to a self-organized structuration process 
that is reshaping the almost normal distribution of capitalist consumers over firms in the 
very beginning. After 15 – 20 years, capitalist consumers are distributed differently, 
resulting in a bimodal distribution with two local maxima. Otherwise in CB4 capitalists 
follow a Veblen effect and act conspicuously. As a consequence capitalist consumers are 
more uniformly distributed in this scenario but prefer firms with higher prices, thus 
spreading over a higher number of firms. In scenario CB2 all households, including 
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capitalists, are subject to a stronger bandwagon effect, which leads capitalist households 
to spread over an even higher number of firms.  
In conclusion, the snob effect – as a contradictory force to bandwagon – may be even 
“innovative” in this regard – compare Tarde (1903: xiv) and Lepinay (2007: 531-535) for 
invention and imitation – since it creates variety and diversity. In this regard, our results 
reproduce the microeconomic conclusions drawn by Malerba et al. (2007) or Safarzynska 
and van den Bergh (2010) on larger scale. This diversity in firm specialization guarantees 
a steady movement of consumers and a replacement of firms by consumers if a 
bandwagon effect is at work (CB3 and CB6).  
 
Figure 6: Firm specialization: capitalist consumer share 
Analysis of the firm specialization processes (Figures 5 and 6) reveals different path-
dependent structuration patterns characterized by different price levels plus the share of 
needs and wants. That said, the investigated signaling-by-consuming effects – the 
Veblenian meso foundation – have a significant influence on the price level of the 
economy which we aim to highlight in Figure 7. It shows the development of the price 
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level in terms of a weighted consumer price index. Due to the random initial household – 
firm matching, households’ initial behavior does not very well reflect their true 
preferences on the consumer goods market. As a result, households are unsatisfied and 
often change their firms’ preferences lists, since the firms’ specialization – and hence, its 
adaptation to differentiated demand – has not come through yet on the supply side. Thus, 
the price level rises quickly during the first five years, as firms often face excess demand 
during this period, which results in frequent price increases. Scenario CB5 is again special 
as it leads to a much longer phase of price increases that stabilizes only after 15 years of 
high price inflation. All the other scenarios indicate a rather steady development in the 
consumer price index.  
 
Figure 7: Consumer price index 
Moreover, the analysis of the dynamics in the consumer price index corresponds very 
well with the simulation data on excess supply. Since our model works without a market 
clearing mechanism, actual sales might deviate from the firms’ expectations. To this 
extent, the relative excess supply – shown in Figure 8 – demonstrates the deviation from 
the planned reserve stock for the various scenarios. This notion means in particular that 
in all scenarios – except CB5 – firms are fighting with grave expectation mismatches in 
the very first years, but lock into an effective inventory reserve rate – 5.5% away from 
the intended rate (𝛼𝛼1 = 0.1) – for the inventory of ~4.5% on average thereafter. By 
contrast, firms in CB5 are far away from their planned reserves in the inventory, i.e. they 
are regularly outsold. Only after 15 years do firms reach the same practical reserve rate 
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of ~4.5% as achieved in the other scenarios. Within those first 15 years, the demand for 
a specific firms’ goods is too high due to the snob effect and conspicuous consumption 
prevalent in all classes. However, households change their firms’ preference lists far too 
often and therefore prohibit steady capacity adjustments for the firms. The intuitive 
response on the supply side is given by substantial price increases as we have already 
highlighted in Figure 7. 
Figure 8: Excess supply in relation to total supply 
Furthermore, the excess supply and the corresponding high price inflation in CB5 
translate into higher firm profits, as shown in Figure 9. The profit rates are in general 
rather low (~2 – 3%) if bandwagon and normal price effects are active in the working 
class. Otherwise in CB5 we see firms’ profits growing very fast, peaking at a profit rate 
of ~15%. These additional capital gains make the Veblen effect even more pronounced 
and luxury want consumption increases because of this feedback loop, therefore the 
economy destabilizes endogenously. 
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Figure 9: Mean profit rate of firms 
Turning the attention to a central macroeconomic measure – aggregate demand – reveals 
the structuration stemming from the dynamic interdependency of the endogenous social 
mediation of consumer preferences and firm specialization. Results are illustrated in 
Figure 10 showing the aggregate demand for consumer goods in the economy, separated 
for the previously described artificial scenarios. The Veblenian meso foundation is 
decisive for the emergent outcome on the macro scale since aggregate demand differs 
substantially around 5% between the different path-dependent developments. The 
exception is again given by CB5 where only the snob and Veblen effects are active. In 
this scenario, aggregate demand immediately decreases by 10% over the first 10 years, 
resulting in a difference of 15 – 20 percentage points to the other scenarios. Note that 
aggregate demand equals household consumption, but does not include unsatisfied 
demand of households, i.e. it does not equal the sum of the intended consumption of 
households. 
34 
 
 
Figure 10: Aggregate demand  –  annual 
Why is there such a slump in aggregate demand in CB5 within the first 10 years while all 
the other scenarios indicate a steady growth in aggregate demand? On the one hand it is 
not possible for all households to consume rare and luxury goods in an economy that 
starts out with medium-sized firms. On the other hand, the bandwagon effect – active in 
all scenarios except CB5 – functions as a social stabilizer for the macroeconomic 
performance, it guarantees a persistent flow of household consumption. Thus firms 
followed by a critical mass of households – ‘jumping on the bandwagon’ – can grow 
steadily into large-scale corporations with a high needs share and a low price (see Figure 5 
again). Furthermore, these firms are then able to sustain the slowly increasing demand 
via continuous capacity adjustments in comparison to smaller firms selling a higher wants 
share with relatively higher prices. These latter firms serve the capitalists’ desires and do 
not contribute to an increase in aggregate demand as high as the larger firms which are 
followed on the basis of the bandwagon effect. Otherwise, this notion means that in the 
absence of bandwagon and normal price effects accompanied by a stark presence of snob 
and Veblen effects – as it is the case in CB5 – the economy destabilizes dramatically 
owing to snob effect and conspicuous consumption. Firms on the one hand cannot expect 
a comparable persistence in consumption flows and on the other they cannot increase 
steadily their prices as a reaction to the demonstrative spending behavior in all social 
classes now as shown in the previous figures. The increasing inflation (Figure 7) 
eventually leads to the slump in aggregate demand since prices are adjusted monthly (see 
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Figure 11) but wages only annually. As a consequence, we can observe these 
fundamentally different macroeconomic developmental paths. 
 
Figure 11: Aggregate demand  –  monthly 
In addition to that, we aim to highlight that these macroeconomic conclusions are 
significantly robust, having been drawn from the analysis of a stable system behavior 
generated by our simulation experiments. The robustness of such results depends of 
course on the complexity of the agent-based model, but more specifically on the 
proportional relations of assumptions made. Monthly data as presented in Figure 11 for 
aggregate demand show the slight seasonal fluctuations. These are also influenced by 
annual changes in capital gains which are distributed once per year and thus affect 
capitalist household consumption behavior more strongly. Moreover, repetitions of the 
same parameter combinations (scenarios) fluctuate less strongly between repetitions of 
more stable scenarios, e.g. CB6, and more strongly for rather unstable scenarios, e.g. CB5. 
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Figure 12: Unemployment rate 
Eventually Figure 12 shows the path-dependent development in the labor market by 
indicating the unemployment rate in the economy. The differences among the scenarios 
are pronounced and substantiate the previous analysis. A close inspection of scenario CB5 
shows a maximum unemployment rate peaking at 16%, and more specifically a higher 
variance between repetitions than in other scenarios. Although reducing to lower levels 
in the long run, this particular social mediation of consumer preferences turns the 
economy into severe macroeconomic turmoil. Otherwise, all other scenarios tend to 
stabilize after peaking between years 5 and 10 to very low unemployment rates between 
2 and 4%. The comparatively volatile developments during the first ten years represent 
the manifestations of the self-organization process restructuring the market for consumer 
goods, as it develops away from the artificial initial conditions. Furthermore, the analysis 
of the unemployment rate substantiates our previous conclusions about the role of the 
bandwagon effect for evolutionary macro dynamics. We can report its stabilizing role, 
this time with regard to long-run employment.  
At this point we could project that a further introduction of a complementary 
Schumpeterian meso foundation – on innovation and technological change – would 
increase labor productivity and counteract the bandwagon effect. This setting would lead 
to technological unemployment at least in the short run – caused e.g. by increasing 
automation – and counteract the bandwagon effect in terms of aggregate demand and 
employment. However, a clear comparative analysis of both evolutionary meso effects 
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(Veblenian plus Schumpeterian) in action goes far beyond the scope of this article, but 
indicates stimulating research potential for the future.  
5. Concluding remarks 
Evolutionary macroeconomics offers a new approach by employing computational social 
simulation of dynamic micro-meso-macro frameworks. We understand evolutionary 
macroeconomics as an integral part of evolutionary political economy that can shed light 
on the dynamic effects of specified agent heterogeneity and diversity for typical macro 
aggregates. These measures imply welfare effects for individual agents in political 
economy terms, with actual losers and winners. In our article we presented such an 
evolutionary macroeconomic model – specified along a Veblenian meso foundation – and 
analyzed the long-run welfare effects for capitalists as well as workers by means of 
artificial simulation experiments.  
To this effect, the micro level of the macroeconomic system is not reduced to a 
representative micro foundation but entails a population of heterogeneous interacting 
agents and so evolves as a complex adaptive system. Basic information sharing among 
agents via simple communication structures is a necessary characteristic for a meso 
foundation that is socializing agent collectives through common patterns of political 
economic behavior. The significant difference between a micro and a meso foundation 
relates to this latter property. Micro may guarantee for heterogeneity but cannot involve 
diversity in a population of economic agents. Otherwise, a meso foundation generates a 
diversity of distinguishable agent collectives within the whole population (Scholz-
Wäckerle 2017). It thereby modularizes the full set of heterogeneous agents into different 
subsets (Simon 1962) and creates social structure. In our model, this social structure is 
characterized by the endogenous development of Marxian social classes and Veblenian 
social stratification.  
The agent-based methodology allows the implementation of such an evolutionary 
macroeconomic complex adaptive system with a specified meso foundation. In addition, 
this approach enables the complementary performance of bottom-up self-organization 
(households, firms, banks) vis-à-vis top-down governance (government, central bank). In 
this article, we have demonstrated the explanatory power of evolutionary 
macroeconomics with a concrete example, in particular a Veblenian meso foundation 
with signaling-by-consuming effects, dependent on social class. We have shown that the 
co-evolutionary dynamics between household behavior and firm specialization lead to the 
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emergence of some deeper structure in the consumer goods market on the one hand and 
to significantly different macroeconomic outcomes in simulation experiments on the 
other. The social mediation of consumption plays a crucial role for the path-dependent 
development of an economy.  
First, the bandwagon effect acts as an endogenous stabilizer for the macroeconomic 
system. It facilitates steady growth in aggregate demand. Second, the snob effect leads to 
a bimodal distribution – by endogenously restructuring the market for consumer goods – 
of firms, with larger and relatively low-price firms serving the needs of the working class 
and smaller and relatively high-price firms serving the wants of the wealthy workers and 
capitalists. Third, the combination of snob and Veblen effect in the capitalist class is the 
only signaling-by-consuming mix that may cause stagflationary economic turmoil on the 
macro scale if it is not compensated by a normal price and bandwagon effect in the 
working class. To sum up, the working class stabilizes the macroeconomic system by 
consuming in accordance with a normal price effect with its bandwagon-guided needs 
consumption. The capitalist class destabilizes it by consumption according to the Veblen 
effect with its snob-guided wants consumption. Although the latter keeps the economy in 
continuous change, creates variety and diversity in patterns of consumption and changes 
the firm population endogenously, it needs to get complemented by working-class 
consumption behavior or it turns the economy down. If the banks are modeled as being 
risk-averse, grant loans quite conservatively and firms therefore do not grow explosively 
– as it is the case in our conducted simulation experiments – these complementary (and 
to some extent co-evolutionary) dynamics lead to a stable macroeconomic development 
path. However, the achieved stability may get disrupted once the working class switches 
to snob and Veblen effects in their needs consumption as well. This notion may be 
problematic in an economy where consumption is made exclusively on easily available 
private loans, as it is a tendency in financial capitalism. 
In conclusion, evolutionary macroeconomics – following the agent-based methodology – 
provide new insights on the inner dynamics of an economy with regard to its multileveled 
structure. The advantage of the presented approach lies in the simultaneous analysis of 
micro, meso and macro components. One can test social theories of endogenous change 
– such as Veblen’s theory of the leisure class – in macroeconomic environments. The 
individual agents are modeled under terms of bounded rationality and satisficing rules of 
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thumb, but social adaptation characterizes them as heterogeneous and diverse decision 
makers within a complex evolving system. 
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Monthly simulation phases 
 
Founding phase 
Households evaluate and initiate firm founding 
Production phase 
Firms make demand estimation and pricing 
Firms make credit adjustment and production 
Firms adapt prices 
Sales and consumption phase 
Households check financial status 
Households decide consumption budget 
Households buy needs goods 
Households (capitalists) buy wants goods 
Households (workers) buy wants goods 
Households update needs vendor lists 
Households update wants vendor lists 
Households balance accounts with savings if indebted or declare bankruptcy 
Wages payment phase 
Firms pay wages 
Government pays pensions 
Government pays unemployment subsidies 
Saving phase 
Households transfer money to savings accounts 
Interest and consolidation phase 
Banks collect loans interest 
Banks collect loans repayments 
Banks calculate accounts interest 
Banks calculate savings interest 
Banks pay central bank loans interest 
Banks pay central bank loans repayments 
Firms’ monthly accounting 
Banks verify firms’ solvency 
Banks’ monthly accounting 
Banks calculate refinancing demands 
Banks refinance themselves at central bank 
Banks transfer funds to facilities at central bank 
Central bank pays reserve interest 
Central bank pays deposit facilities interest 
Government refinancing phase 
Update macro indicators 
Banks’ monthly accounting 
Central bank’s monthly accounting 
Government’s monthly accounting 
Country updates macro indicators 
 
Annual Simulation Phases 
 
Annual accounting phase 
Banks collect and pay accounts interest 
Banks pay savings interest 
Firms calculate profits and pay taxes 
Banks calculate profits and pay taxes 
Firms distribute profits 
Banks distribute profits 
Capital goods firms distribute profits 
Government updates annual statistics (annual taxes) 
Country compiles annual report 
Government checks minimum wage increase 
Appendix 1  –  Timing of events
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Government increases unemployment subsidies if minimum wage increased 
Government evaluates pension increase based on CPI 
Firms evaluate wage increases based on CPI 
Capital goods firm adapts prices based on CPI 
Firms depreciate production capital 
 
 
To implement the computational simulation of the presented model we chose the widely used Netlogo 
simulation environment (Wilensky 1999) in the version 5.2 without any special Netlogo extensions.  
The presented experiment was set up using Netlogo’s built-in BehaviorSpace experiment management 
engine to repeat each scenarios 30 times, each time using a different random seed to account for the random 
factors in the model. This resulted in 180 different simulation runs, which were calculated in parallel on 
multiple computers. Aggregate time series data were generated directly by BehaviorSpace for each period, 
whereas micro data were only saved for selected periods. Data analysis and visualization was realized using 
the R language (with the ggplot2 package). Annual data shown are either means over the periods 
representing a year (flows) or the state in the last period of an artificial year (stocks).  
The experiments were run with 5000 households including workers, pensioners and capitalists, and started 
with an initial firm population of 250 firms. Additionally the experiment included five banks and a 
rudimentary capital goods firm, the government and a central bank. Other relevant simulation parameters 
are shown in the table below. 
 
Main simulation parameters 
Households 
Number of vendors on preferred lists (𝛾𝛾2) 7 
Number of regular replacement checks per month 1 
Reserves of needs 1 period 
Intended consumption rate, worker households (𝛽𝛽1) 0.1 
Intended consumption rate, wealthy worker households (𝛽𝛽2) 0.15 
Intended consumption rate, capitalist households (𝛽𝛽3) 0.2 
Rate of consumption with respect to savings (𝛾𝛾1) 0.05 / 12 
Initial savings endowment of worker households 
𝑋𝑋2 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤household 
𝑋𝑋2~𝑈𝑈(1,2)  
Initial savings endowment of capitalist households 10 ∗ (𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤) 
  
Firms 
Initial ratio capital (individual firm level) to wages (annual) 2 
Technology coefficient (𝛼𝛼4) 1 
Production reserve stock rate (𝛼𝛼1) 0.1 
Unsold stock depreciation rate (per period) (𝛿𝛿1) 0.5 
Capital depreciation rate (annual) 0.1 
Firm founding probability (monthly) 1/18 
Price adjustment rate (𝛼𝛼2) 0.01 
Maximum price adjustment (𝛼𝛼3) 0.1 
Stock adjustment indifference rate (𝛼𝛼4) 0.25 
Common fixed production technology coefficient (𝛼𝛼5) 1 
Capital intensity parameter (𝛼𝛼6) 0.2 
New price adoption probability (𝜃𝜃1) 1/3 
 
Banks 
Credit term 5 years 
Credit interest rate (annual) 0.04 
Appendix 2  –  Technical details of the computational simulation  
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Account interest rate (annual) 0.01 
Account overdraft rate (private credit, annual) 0.05 
Savings interest rate (annual) 0.015 
Firm credit risk parameter (𝜙𝜙1) 0.5 
Central bank deposit interest rate (annual) 0.01 
Central bank loans interest rate (annual) 0.02 
  
Government 
Initial minimum wage 1000 
Initial unemployment subsidy 1000 
Minimum wage increase minimal interval 5 years 
Employment protection duration 2 months 
Value added tax rate 0.1 
Labor tax rate (flat for all worker households) 0.15 
Income tax rate (flat for all capitalist households) 0.15 
Capital gains tax rate 0.15 
Corporate tax rate (banks, firms, capital goods firm) 0.15 
 
 
Worker needs 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (1) 
𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (2) 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (3) 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜉𝜉) (4) 
As presented in Section 2, 𝜉𝜉 = 0.75 in this case. 
Worker wants 
Signaling-by-consuming in the case of worker wants is defined according to equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) 
by setting 𝜉𝜉 = 0.25. In this case we put a much stronger weight on the bandwagon effect than on the price 
effect. 
Wealthy worker wants 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (5) 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜉𝜉) (6) 
Signaling-by-consuming in the case of wealthy worker wants is defined according to equations (5), (2), (3) 
and (6). Again 𝜉𝜉 = 0.25, assigning a much stronger weight on the bandwagon effect than on the price 
effect. Additionally the price effect (now 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣) is now a Veblen effect and thus reversed in comparison to 
cases 1 and 2. 
Capitalist needs 
Appendix 3  –  Signaling by consuming effects (Section 2/Figure 1)
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𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 = � 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (7) 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 (1 − 𝜉𝜉) (8) 
Signaling-by-consuming in the case of capitalist needs is defined according to equations (1), (2), (7) and 
(8). In the capitalist cases 𝜉𝜉 = 0.5, thus putting equal weights on the bandwagon and price effects. The 
price effect is again a regular price effect as in cases 1 and 2 (though less strong as 𝜉𝜉 is chosen differently), 
but will implicitly get less important for very wealthy capitalists, as the wealth weight 𝑏𝑏 will reduce its 
effect. Furthermore, 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 now represents a snob effect. 
Capitalist wants 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 (1 − 𝜉𝜉) (9) 
Signaling-by-consuming in the case of capitalist wants is defined according to equations (5), (2), (7) and 
(9). Again 𝜉𝜉 = 0.5 thus putting equal weights on the bandwagon and price effects. The price effect (now 
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣) is a Veblen effect like in the case of capitalist needs while 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 again represents a snob effect. 
 
